Books
(1) Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.
(2020) Oxford University Press. (notes)
(2) The A Priori Without Magic. (2022) Cambridge University Press. Elements
Series. (notes)
Papers and Articles
(1) The Possibility of Truth by Convention. (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65(258):
84-93.
(2) Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument. (2015) Philosophical Quarterly
65(259): 241-253.
(3) Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences. (2015) Synthese
192(5): 1351-1371.
(4) Talking with Tonkers. (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15(24): 1-24.
(5) Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016)
Metaphilosophy 47(1): 108-121.
(6) Sider on the Epistemology of Structure. (2016) Philosophical Studies 173(9):
2417-2435.
(7) Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism. (2017) Synthese 194(5): 1643-1662.
(8) Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention. (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic
46(2): 119-139.
(9) Internal and External Questions Revisited. (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113(4):
177-209.
(10) Change of Logic, Change of Meaning. (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 96(2): 431-442.
(11) Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility. (2017) Philosophical Review
126(1): 81-122.
(12) (with Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy.
(2020) Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
(13) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics. (2019)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98(3): 592-605.
(14) Killing Kripkenstein's Monster. (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.
(15) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance. (2020). Routledge Handbook of Philosophy
of Relativism: 349-357.
(16) (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth. (2020) Philosophical
Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.
(17) Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments. (2020) Philosophical
Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.
(18) Infinite Reasoning. (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2):
385-407.
(19) Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge. (2021) Journal of
Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.
(20) Functionalism About Inference. (2025) Inquiry 68(2): 718-142.
(21) This Quintessence of Dust – Consciousness Explained, at Thirty. (2021)
Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.
(22) Defending Understanding-Assent Links. (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.
(23) Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers. (2022)
Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.
(24) Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity. (2022) Journal of
Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.
(25) Gruesome Counterfactuals. (2021) Dialectica 75(3): 319-336.
(26) The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism. (2024) Oxford Studies
in the Philosophy of Mind 4: 175-230.
(27) Imagination and the A Priori. (2023) Synthese 201(1): 1-16.
(28) The Independence Solution to Grue. (2023) Philosophical Studies 180(4):
1305-1326.
(29) Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist. (2024) Erkenntnis 89(7): 2825-2833.
(30) Restricting the T-Schema to Solve the Liar. (2024) Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 108(1): 238-258.
(31) (with Rosa Cao) Mental Representation, "Standing-In-For", and Internal Models.
(2025) Philosophical Psychology 38(2): 279-396.
(32) Logical Conventionalism. (forthcoming) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Logic.
(33) Solving the Mystery of Mathematics. (2023) Philosophy Now 157: 16-19.
(34) The Liar Paradox and "Meaningless" Revenge. (2023) Journal of Philosophical
Logic 53(1): 49-78.
(35) (with Rosa Cao) Neural Decoding, The Atlantis Machine, and Zombies. (2023)
Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 49-78.
(36) The Strengthened Liar Problem. (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of
Philosophy.
(37) Anti-Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. (forthcoming) Philosophical
Studies.
(38) Analyzing the A Priori. (forthcoming) Philosophy.
(39) The Background, Failure, and Aftermath of Nozick's Attempt to Justify the State.
(forthcoming) The Journal of Libertarian Studies.
(40) Applying the Copernican Principle to the Problem of Induction. (forthcoming)
Philosophy of Science.
(41) Truth Deflationism, Meaning Deflationism, and Counterfactual Blindness. (forthcoming) Analysis.
(42) Substitutional Quantification and Arithmetical Truth. (forthcoming) Noûs.
Paper notes – supplementary notes and errata.
There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach:
- Papers developing, defending, and explaining inferentialist and conventionalist theories in logic, mathematics, and beyond [(1),(3),(4),(8),(24),(32),(33),(37)]
- Papers about meaning-change, analyticity, and the a priori that don't assume conventionalism [(10),(22),(27),(38)]
- Papers on quantifier variance [(2),(11),(13),(15),(23)]
- Metaontology, metasemantics, and metaphilosophy papers that don't assume quantifier variance [(5),(9),(17),(19),(29),(41)]
- Papers about determinacy and truth in mathematics [(12),(16),(18),(42)]
- Papers developing epistemological challenges for metaphysical forms of realism [(6),(7)]
- Papers aiming at naturalistic theories of rule-following, inference, consciousness, and representation [(14),(20),(21),(31),(35)]
- Papers that try to solve the grue puzzle/new riddle of induction [(25),(28)]
- A paper defending sense-data and tackling external world skepticism [(26)]
- Papers on truth and the liar paradox [(30),(34),(36)]
- A paper on political philosophy and natural rights [(39)]
- A paper outlining a solution to the traditional problem of induction [(40)]
Jared Warren
I'm a philosopher with broad interests.
Shadows of Syntax will be published in paperback in the summer of 2026.
I'm currently finishing a book on the liar paradox, tentatively titled Dissolving the Liar Paradox. Bestseller list, here I come!