Books
(1) Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.
(2020) Oxford University Press. (notes)
(2) The A Priori Without Magic. (2022) Cambridge University Press. Elements
Series. (notes)
Papers and Articles
(1) The Possibility of Truth by Convention. (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65(258):
84-93.
(2) Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument. (2015) Philosophical Quarterly
65(259): 241-253.
(3) Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences. (2015) Synthese
192(5): 1351-1371.
(4) Talking with Tonkers. (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15(24): 1-24.
(5) Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016)
Metaphilosophy 47(1): 108-121.
(6) Sider on the Epistemology of Structure. (2016) Philosophical Studies 173(9):
2417-2435.
(7) Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism. (2017) Synthese 194(5): 1643-1662.
(8) Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention. (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic
46(2): 119-139.
(9) Internal and External Questions Revisited. (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113(4):
177-209.
(10) Change of Logic, Change of Meaning. (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 96(2): 431-442.
(11) Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility. (2017) Philosophical Review
126(1): 81-122.
(12) (with Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy.
(2020) Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
(13) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics. (2019)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98(3): 592-605.
(14) Killing Kripkenstein's Monster. (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.
(15) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance. (2020). Routledge Handbook of Philosophy
of Relativism: 349-357.
(16) (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth. (2020) Philosophical
Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.
(17) Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments. (2020) Philosophical
Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.
(18) Infinite Reasoning. (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2):
385-407.
(19) Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge. (2021) Journal of
Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.
(20) Functionalism About Inference. (2025) Inquiry 68(2): 718-142.
(21) This Quintessence of Dust – Consciousness Explained, at Thirty. (2021)
Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.
(22) Defending Understanding-Assent Links. (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.
(23) Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers. (2022)
Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.
(24) Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity. (2022) Journal of
Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.
(25) Gruesome Counterfactuals. (2021) Dialectica 75(3): 319-336.
(26) The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism. (2024) Oxford Studies
in the Philosophy of Mind 4: 175-230.
(27) Imagination and the A Priori. (2023) Synthese 201(1): 1-16.
(28) The Independence Solution to Grue. (2023) Philosophical Studies 180(4):
1305-1326.
(29) Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist. (2024) Erkenntnis 89(7): 2825-2833.
(30) Restricting the T-Schema to Solve the Liar. (2024) Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 108(1): 238-258.
(31) (with Rosa Cao) Mental Representation, "Standing-In-For", and Internal Models.
(2025) Philosophical Psychology 38(2): 279-396.
(32) Logical Conventionalism. (forthcoming) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Logic.
(33) Solving the Mystery of Mathematics. (2023) Philosophy Now 157: 16-19.
(34) The Liar Paradox and "Meaningless" Revenge. (2023) Journal of Philosophical
Logic 53(1): 49-78.
(35) (with Rosa Cao) Neural Decoding, The Atlantis Machine, and Zombies. (2023)
Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 49-78.
(36) The Strengthened Liar Problem. (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of
Philosophy.
(37) Anti-Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. (forthcoming) Philosophical
Studies.
(38) Analyzing the A Priori. (forthcoming) Philosophy.
(39) The Background, Failure, and Aftermath of Nozick's Attempt to Justify the State.
(forthcoming) The Journal of Libertarian Studies.
Paper notes – supplementary notes and errata.
There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach:
- Papers developing, defending, and explaining inferentialist and conventionalist theories in logic, mathematics, and beyond [(1),(3),(4),(8),(24),(32),(33),(37)]
- Papers about meaning-change, analyticity, and the a priori that don't assume conventionalism [(10),(22),(27),(38)]
- Papers on quantifier variance [(2),(11),(13),(15),(23)]
- Metaontology, metasemantics, and metaphilosophy papers that don't assume quantifier variance [(5),(9),(17),(19),(29)]
- Papers about determinacy and truth in mathematics [(12),(16),(18)]
- Papers developing epistemological challenges for metaphysical forms of realism [(6),(7)]
- Papers aiming at naturalistic theories of rule-following, inference, consciousness, and representation [(14),(20),(21),(31),(35)]
- Papers that try to solve the grue puzzle/new riddle of induction [(25),(28)]
- A paper defending sense-data and tackling external world skepticism [(26)]
- Papers on truth and the liar paradox [(30),(34),(36)]
- A paper on political philosophy and natural rights [(39)]
Jared Warren
I'm a philosopher with broad interests.
Shadows of Syntax will be published in paperback in the summer of 2026.
I'm currently finishing a book on the liar paradox, tentatively titled Dissolving the Liar Paradox. Bestseller list, here I come!