Jared Warren
I'm a philosopher with broad interests, and an assistant professor at Stanford University.
Books
(1) Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism (2020) Oxford
University Press.
(2) The A Priori Without Magic (2022) Cambridge University Press.
Papers and Articles
(1) The Possibility of Truth by Convention (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 84-93.
(2) Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 241-253.
(3) Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences (2015) Synthese 192 (5): 1351-1371.
(4) Talking with Tonkers (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15 (24): 1-24.
(5) Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016) Metaphilosophy 47 (1): 108-121.
(6) Sider on the Epistemology of Structure (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2417-2435.
(7) Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism (2017) Synthese 194 (5): 1643-1662.
(8) Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2): 119-139.
(9) Internal and External Questions Revisited (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113 (4): 177-209.
(10) Change of Logic, Change of Meaning (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 421-442.
(11) Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility (2017) Philosophical Review 126 (1): 81-122.
(12) (with Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy (2020)
Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
(13) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics (2019)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605.
(14) Killing Kripkenstein's Monster (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.
(15) (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance (2019) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism: 349-357.
(16) (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.
(17) Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.
(18) Infinite Reasoning (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2): 385-407.
(19) Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge (2021) Journal of Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.
(20) Functionalism About Inference (forthcoming) Inquiry
(21) This Quintessence of Dust — Consciousness Explained, at Thirty (2021) Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.
(22) Defending Understanding-Assent Links (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.
(23) Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers (2022) Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.
(24) Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity (2022) Journal of Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.
(25) Gruesome Counterfactuals (forthcoming) Dialectica
(26) The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism (forthcoming) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4
(27) Imagination and the A Priori (2023) Synthese 201(1)
(28) The Independence Solution to Grue (2023) Philosophical Studies 180(4): 1305-1326.
(29) Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist (forthcoming) Erkenntnis
(30) Restricting the T-Schema to Solve the Liar (2024) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(1): 238-258.
(31) (with Rosa Cao) Mental Representation, "Standing-In-For", and Internal Models (forthcoming) Philosophical Psychology
(32) Logical Conventionalism (forthcoming) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic
(33) Solving the Mystery of Mathematics (2023) Philosophy Now 157:16-19.
(34) The Liar Paradox and "Meaningless" Revenge (forthcoming) Journal of Philosophical Logic
(35) (with Rosa Cao) Neural Decoding, The Atlantis Machine, and Zombies (2023) Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 69-89.
(36) The Strengthened Liar Problem (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of Philosophy
There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach: