Jared Warren

I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University with wide-ranging philosophical interests. My CV is here. My e-mail address is jaredwar@stanford.edu.

My first book (SHADOWS of SYNTAX) develops a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics on the basis of an inferentialist theory of meaning, including a conventionalist-friendly metaontology and a naturalistic treatment of mathematical determinacy. The book will be released in 2020.

Published Papers

     (1)   "The Possibility of Truth by Convention" (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 84-93.
"Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument" (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 241-253.

     (3)   "Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences" (2015) Synthese 192 (5): 1351-1371.
"Talking with Tonkers" (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15 (24): 1-24.

     (5)   "Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist?" (2016) Metaphilosophy 47 (1): 108-121.
"Sider on the Epistemology of Structure"(2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2417-2435.
"Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism" (2017) Synthese 194 (5): 1643-1662.
"​Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention" (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2): 119-139.

     (9)   "Internal and External Questions Revisited" (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113 (4): 177-209.
"Change of Logic, Change of Meaning" (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 421-442.

"Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility" (2017) Philosophical Review 126 (1): 81-122.
   (12)   (with
Daniel Waxman) "A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy" (2020)   
             Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
   (13)   (with
Eli Hirsch) "Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics" (2019) ​
             Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605.

   (14)   "Killing Kripkenstein's Monster" (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.

   (15)   (with Eli Hirsch) "Quantifier Variance" (2019) Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of 

             Relativism: 349-357.

   (16)   (with Daniel Waxman) "Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth" (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.

   (17)   "Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments" (forthcoming) Philosophical Studies

   (18)   "Infinite Reasoning" (forthcoming) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Papers are listed chronologically in order of acceptance.  All except (15) were blindly reviewed. Though blindly reviewed, (12) was submitted to a special issue. All other papers were unsolicited, open submissions, blindly reviewed. I have ceteris paribus policies against accepting invitations to contribute to volumes, submitting to paper prizes and competitions, and writing book reviews. In this my publication policies largely agree with those of David Lewis.

(15) is a short but fairly comprehensive introduction to quantifier variance and its applications. It might be useful to those teaching classes on metaontology and metaphysics, so I have linked to a penultimate draft above. Please cite from the published version.

Among the things I've been thinking about recently are zombies, representation, friendship, set theory, arithmetical determinacy, inference, imagination, induction, belief holism, the a priori, justice, and the liar paradox.