Jared Warren

I'm a philosopher. Lately I've been thinking about liar paradoxes, external world skepticism, Boltzman brains, the problems of induction, attempts to justify the state, and the definition of "art", among other things.


I can be reached by e-mail at jaredwar@stanford.edu.


Books


    (1)   Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism (2020) Oxford

                University Press.

    (2)   The A Priori Without Magic (2022) Cambridge University Press.


SOS notesA Priori notes.


Papers and Articles


     (1)   The Possibility of Truth by Convention (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 84-93.
     (2)  
Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 241-253.

     (3)   Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences (2015) Synthese 192 (5): 1351-1371.
     (4)  
Talking with Tonkers (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15 (24): 1-24.

     (5)   Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016) Metaphilosophy 47 (1): 108-121.
     (6)  
Sider on the Epistemology of Structure  (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2417-2435.
     (7)  
Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism (2017) Synthese 194 (5): 1643-1662.
     (8)  
Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2): 119-139.

     (9)   Internal and External Questions Revisited (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113 (4): 177-209.
   (10)  
Change of Logic, Change of Meaning (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 421-442.
   (11)   Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility (2017) Philosophical Review 126 (1): 81-122.
   (12)   (with
Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy (2020)   
             Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
   (13)   (with
Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics (2019) ​
             Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605.

   (14)   Killing Kripkenstein's Monster (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.

   (15)   (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance (2019) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism: 349-357.

   (16)   (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.

   (17)   Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.

   (18)   Infinite Reasoning (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2): 385-407.

   (19)   Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge (2021) Journal of Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.

   (20)   Functionalism About Inference (forthcoming) Inquiry

   (21)   This Quintessence of Dust —  Consciousness Explained, at Thirty (2021) Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.

   (22)   Defending Understanding-Assent Links (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.

   (23)   Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers (2022) Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.

   (24)   Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity (2022) Journal of Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.

   (25)   Gruesome Counterfactuals (forthcoming) Dialectica

   (26)   The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism (forthcoming) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4

   (27)   Imagination and the A Priori (2023) Synthese 201(1)

   (28)   The Independence Solution to Grue (2023) Philosophical Studies 180(4): 1305-1326.

   (29)   Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist (forthcoming) Erkenntnis

   (30)   Restricting the T-Schema to Solve the Liar (2024) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(1): 238-258.

   (31)   (with Rosa Cao) Mental Representation, "Standing-In-For", and Internal Models  (forthcoming)  Philosophical Psychology

   (32)   Logical Conventionalism (forthcoming) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic

   (33)   Solving the Mystery of Mathematics (2023) Philosophy Now 157:16-19.

   (34)   The Liar Paradox and "Meaningless" Revenge  (forthcoming) Journal of Philosophical Logic

   (35)   (with Rosa Cao) Neural Decoding, The Atlantis Machine, and Zombies (2023) Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 69-89.

   
Paper notes.


There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach:


  • Papers developing, defending, and explaining inferentialist and conventionalist theories in logic, mathematics, and beyond [(1),(3),(4),(8),(24),(32),(33)]
  • Papers about meaning-change, analyticity, and the a priori that don't assume conventionalism [(10),(22),(27)]
  • Papers on quantifier variance [(2),(11),(13),(15),(23)]
  • Metaontology and metaphilosophy papers that don't assume quantifier variance [(5),(9),(17),(19)]
  • Papers about determinacy and truth in mathematics [(12),(16),(18)]
  • Papers developing epistemological challenges for metaphysical forms of realism [(6),(7)]
  • Papers aiming at naturalistic theories of rule-following, inference, consciousness, and representation [(14),(20),(21),(31),(35)]
  • Papers that try to solve the grue puzzle/new riddle of induction [(25),(28)]
  • A paper defending sense-data and tackling external world skepticism [(26)]
  • A metasemantics paper that doesn't assume inferentialism [(29)]
  • Two papers on truth and the liar paradox [(30),(34)]