Jared Warren

I'm a philosopher and an assistant professor at Stanford University. Here is my CV.


I'm interested in all of the major problems and questions and puzzles of traditional philosophy. I want to solve these problems, answer these questions, and dissolve these puzzles. And I want to explain the solutions, answers, and dissolutions in clear, simple, graceful, lively English prose in the tradition of Berkeley, Hume, Russell, and Ayer. As life goals go, mine are slightly easier than transmuting lead into gold...probably.


Books


    (1)   Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism (2020) Oxford

                University Press.

    (2)   The A Priori Without Magic (2022) Cambridge University Press.


SOS notes.  A Priori Element notes.


Papers


     (1)   The Possibility of Truth by Convention (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 84-93.
     (2)  
Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 241-253.

     (3)   Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences (2015) Synthese 192 (5): 1351-1371.
     (4)  
Talking with Tonkers (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15 (24): 1-24.

     (5)   Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016) Metaphilosophy 47 (1): 108-121.
     (6)  
Sider on the Epistemology of Structure  (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2417-2435.
     (7)  
Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism (2017) Synthese 194 (5): 1643-1662.
     (8)  
Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2): 119-139.

     (9)   Internal and External Questions Revisited (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113 (4): 177-209.
   (10)  
Change of Logic, Change of Meaning (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 421-442.
   (11)   Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility (2017) Philosophical Review 126 (1): 81-122.
   (12)   (with
Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy (2020)   
             Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
   (13)   (with
Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics (2019) ​
             Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605.

   (14)   Killing Kripkenstein's Monster (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.

   (15)   (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance (2019) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism: 349-357.

   (16)   (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.

   (17)   Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.

   (18)   Infinite Reasoning (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2): 385-407.

   (19)   Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge (2021) Journal of Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.

   (20)   Functionalism About Inference (forthcoming) Inquiry

   (21)   This Quintessence of Dust —  Consciousness Explained, at Thirty (2021) Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.

   (22)   Defending Understanding-Assent Links (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.

   (23)   Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers (2022) Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.

   (24)   Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity (2022) Journal of Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.

   (25)   Gruesome Counterfactuals (forthcoming) Dialectica

   (26)   The Sense-Data Language and the Real Skeptical Challenge (forthcoming) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4

   (27)   Imagination and the A Priori (forthcoming) Synthese

   
Paper notes.


There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach:


  • Papers developing and defending inferentialist and conventionalist theories in logic, mathematics, and beyond [(1),(3),(4),(8),(24)]
  • Papers about meaning-change, analyticity, and the a priori that don't assume conventionalism [(10),(22),(27)]
  • Papers on quantifier variance [(2),(11),(13),(15),(23)]
  • Metaontology and metaphilosophy papers unrelated to quantifier variance [(5),(9),(17),(19)]
  • Papers about determinacy and truth in mathematics [(12),(16),(18)]
  • Papers on epistemological challenges for realism [(6),(7)]
  • Papers offering naturalistic theories of rule-following, inference, and consciousness [(14),(20),(21)]
  • A paper about induction and grue [(25)]
  • A paper defending sense-data and trying to solve the real skeptical challenge [(26)]