Jared Warren

I'm a philosopher. For the last several years I have had major long-term projects in progress on the liar paradox, epistemological challenges to realism, the problem of induction, external world skepticism, the nature of meaning, and more. I saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, but I'm trying to maintain some hope that time and chance and other factors won't prevent me from completing these projects in a satisfying fashion.


Books


    (1)   Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism (2020) Oxford

                University Press.

    (2)   The A Priori Without Magic (2022) Cambridge University Press.


SOS notes.  A Priori notes.


Papers and Articles


     (1)   The Possibility of Truth by Convention (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258): 84-93.
     (2)   Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Argument (2015) Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259): 241-253.

     (3)   Conventionalism, Consistency, and Consistency Sentences (2015) Synthese 192 (5): 1351-1371.
     (4)   Talking with Tonkers (2015) Philosophers' Imprint 15 (24): 1-24.

     (5)   Trapping the Metasemantic Metaphilosophical Deflationist? (2016) Metaphilosophy 47 (1): 108-121.
     (6)   Sider on the Epistemology of Structure  (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (9): 2417-2435.
     (7)   Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism (2017) Synthese 194 (5): 1643-1662.
​     (8)   Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention (2017) Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2): 119-139.

     (9)   Internal and External Questions Revisited (2016) Journal of Philosophy 113 (4): 177-209.
   (10)   Change of Logic, Change of Meaning (2018) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 421-442.
   (11)   Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility (2017) Philosophical Review 126 (1): 81-122.
   (12)   (with Daniel Waxman) A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy (2020)   
             Synthese 197(2): 477-495.
   (13)   (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance and the Demand for a Semantics (2019) ​
             Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 592-605.

   (14)   Killing Kripkenstein's Monster (2020) Noûs 54(2): 257-289.

   (15)   (with Eli Hirsch) Quantifier Variance (2019) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism: 349-357.

   (16)   (with Daniel Waxman) Supertasks and Arithmetical Truth (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(5): 1275-1282.

   (17)   Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments (2020) Philosophical Studies 177(10): 2851-2859.

   (18)   Infinite Reasoning (2021) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2): 385-407.

   (19)   Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge (2021) Journal of Philosophical Logic 50(6): 1231-1248.

   (20)   Functionalism About Inference (2025) Inquiry 68(2): 718-742.

   (21)   This Quintessence of Dust —  Consciousness Explained, at Thirty (2021) Philosophical Papers 50(1-2): 281-308.

   (22)   Defending Understanding-Assent Links (2021) Synthese 199(3-4): 9219-9236.

   (23)   Quantifier Variance, Semantic Collapse, and "Genuine" Quantifiers (2022) Philosophical Studies 179(3): 745-757.

   (24)   Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity (2022) Journal of Philosophy 119(10): 517-541.

   (25)   Gruesome Counterfactuals (forthcoming) Dialectica

   (26)   The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism (2024) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 4: 175-230.

   (27)   Imagination and the A Priori (2023) Synthese 201(1)

   (28)   The Independence Solution to Grue (2023) Philosophical Studies 180(4): 1305-1326.

   (29)   Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist (2024) Erkenntnis 89(7): 2825-2833.

   (30)   Restricting the T-Schema to Solve the Liar (2024) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108(1): 238-258.

   (31)   (with Rosa Cao) Mental Representation, "Standing-In-For", and Internal Models  (2025)  Philosophical Psychology 38(2): 

            379-396.

   (32)   Logical Conventionalism (forthcoming) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic

   (33)   Solving the Mystery of Mathematics (2023) Philosophy Now 157:16-19.

   (34)   The Liar Paradox and "Meaningless" Revenge  (2023) Journal of Philosophical Logic 53(1): 49-78.

   (35)   (with Rosa Cao) Neural Decoding, The Atlantis Machine, and Zombies (2023) Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 69-89.

   (36)   The Strengthened Liar Problem  (forthcoming) Australasian Journal of Philosophy

   (37)   Anti-Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics  (forthcoming) Philosophical Studies

   
Paper notes.


There is no single, correct way of categorizing my published papers by topic, but here is one approach:


  • Papers developing, defending, and explaining inferentialist and conventionalist theories in logic, mathematics, and beyond [(1),(3),(4),(8),(24),(32),(33)]
  • Papers about meaning-change, analyticity, and the a priori that don't assume conventionalism [(10),(22),(27)]
  • Papers on quantifier variance [(2),(11),(13),(15),(23)]
  • Metaontology and metaphilosophy papers that don't assume quantifier variance [(5),(9),(17),(19)]
  • Papers about determinacy and truth in mathematics [(12),(16),(18)]
  • Papers developing epistemological challenges for metaphysical forms of realism [(6),(7)]
  • Papers aiming at naturalistic theories of rule-following, inference, consciousness, and representation [(14),(20),(21),(31),(35)]
  • Papers that try to solve the grue puzzle/new riddle of induction [(25),(28)]
  • A paper defending sense-data and tackling external world skepticism [(26)]
  • A metasemantics paper that doesn't assume inferentialism [(29)]
  • Papers on truth and the liar paradox [(30),(34),(36)]
  • A paper surveying and contrasting and comparing anti-platonist options in the philosophy of mathematics [(37)]